Enhanced beacon frames in wireless communications

Abstract

This disclosure describes systems, methods, and devices related to using protected beacon frames in wireless communications. A device may determine a beacon management element of a beacon frame body and may determine an integrity group key identifier of the beacon management element, wherein the integrity group key identifier is associated with a basic service set (BSS). The device may determine, based on the integrity group key identifier, a management integrity check (MIC) field of the beacon management element. The device may generate a beacon frame including the beacon frame body. The device may send the beacon frame.

What is claimed is: 
     
         1 . A device, the device comprising storage coupled to processing circuitry, the processing circuitry configured to:
 determine a beacon management element (BME) of a beacon frame body;   determine an integrity group key identifier of the BME, wherein the integrity group key identifier is associated with a basic service set (BSS);   determine, based on the integrity group key identifier, a management integrity check (MIC) field of the BME;   generate a beacon frame, wherein the beacon frame comprises the beacon frame body; and   cause to send the beacon frame.   
     
     
         2 . The device of  claim 1 , wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to determine one or more additional fields of the BME, and wherein to determine the MIC field is further based on the one or more additional fields. 
     
     
         3 . The device of  claim 2 , wherein the one or more additional fields comprise an element identifier field, a length field, and an integrity beacon number field. 
     
     
         4 . The device of  claim 1 , wherein the beacon frame is a first beacon frame, wherein the MIC field is a first MIC field, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to determine a second beacon frame, and wherein the second beacon frame comprises a second MIC field different than the first MIC field. 
     
     
         5 . The device of  claim 4 , wherein the first beacon frame comprises a first beacon number field, wherein the first MIC field is further based on the first beacon number field, wherein the second beacon frame further comprises a second beacon number field and a second MIC field based on the second beacon number field, wherein the second beacon number is greater than the first beacon number, and wherein the first MIC field is different than the second MIC field. 
     
     
         6 . The device of  claim 1 , wherein the BSS is one of multiple BSSs in a multiple basic service set identification (BSSID) set, and wherein the integrity group key identifier is associated with the multiple BSSs. 
     
     
         7 . The device of  claim 1 , wherein to determine the BME comprises to determine the BME without determining a time synchronization factor (TSF). 
     
     
         8 . The device of  claim 1 , further comprising:
 a transceiver configured to transmit and receive wireless signals, wherein the wireless signals comprise the beacon frame; and   an antenna coupled to the transceiver.   
     
     
         9 . A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing computer-executable instructions which when executed by one or more processors result in performing operations comprising:
 identifying, at a station device of a basic service set (BSS), a beacon frame received from an access point;   determining a beacon management entity (BME) of the beacon frame, wherein a beacon body of the beacon frame comprises the BME, and wherein the BME comprises an integrity group key identifier associated with the BSS;   determining, based on the integrity group key identifier, an expected management integrity check (MIC);   determining a MIC field of the BME; and   comparing the expected MIC to the MIC field of the BME.   
     
     
         10 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of  claim 9 , the operations further comprising:
 determining, based on the comparison, that the expected MIC does not match the MIC field; and   discarding the beacon frame.   
     
     
         11 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of  claim 9 , wherein the beacon frame is a first beacon frame, the operations further comprising:
 determining a first integrity beacon number (IBN) of the first beacon frame;   identifying a second beacon frame received from the access point;   determining a second IBN of the second beacon frame;   determining that the second IBN is less than or equal to the first IBN; and   discarding the second beacon frame.   
     
     
         12 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of  claim 9 , wherein determining the MIC is based on the integrity group key identifier. 
     
     
         13 . The non-transitory computer readable medium of  claim 9 , wherein the beacon frame is a first beacon frame, and wherein determining the expected MIC is based on a beacon timestamp of a second beacon frame, the operations further comprising identifying the second beacon frame before identifying the first beacon frame. 
     
     
         14 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of  claim 9 , wherein determining the MIC field is based on one or more additional fields of the BME, and wherein the one or more additional fields comprise at least one of an element identifier field, a length field, or an integrity beacon number field. 
     
     
         15 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of  claim 9 , wherein the BSS is one of multiple BSSs in a multiple basic service set identification (BSSID) set, and wherein the integrity group key identifier is associated with the multiple BSSs. 
     
     
         16 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of  claim 9 , wherein the MIC is not based on a time synchronization factor (TSF). 
     
     
         17 . A method comprising:
 determining, by processing circuitry of an access point, a beacon management element (BME) of a beacon frame body;   determining, by the processing circuitry, an integrity group key identifier of the BME, wherein the integrity group key identifier is associated with a basic service set (BSS);   determining, by the processing circuitry and based on the integrity group key identifier, a management integrity check (MIC) field of the BME;   generating, by the processing circuitry, a beacon frame, wherein the beacon frame comprises the beacon frame body; and   causing to send, by the processing circuitry, the beacon frame.   
     
     
         18 . The method of  claim 17 , further comprising determining one or more additional fields of the BME, and wherein determining the MIC field is further based on the one or more additional fields. 
     
     
         19 . The method of  claim 18 , wherein the one or more additional fields comprise an element identifier field, a length field, and an integrity beacon number field. 
     
     
         20 . The method of  claim 17 , wherein the beacon frame is a first beacon frame, wherein the MIC field is a first MIC field, further comprising determining a second beacon frame, and wherein the second beacon frame comprises a second MIC field different than the first MIC field.