Authentication Mechanism for 5G Technologies

Abstract

Embodiment mutual authentication and security agreement (MASA) protocols may use independently generated integrity and/or encryption keys to securely communicate private information exchanged between UEs and various network-side devices (e.g., base stations, MMEs, HSSs, etc.). In particular, embodiment MASA protocols may use an initial authentication request (IAR) encryption key (KIAR ENC ) to encrypt UE specific information (e.g., an IMSI, etc.) in an IAR message and/or an initial authentication response (IAS) encryption key (KIAS ENC ) to encrypt private information in an IAS message. Additionally, embodiment MASA protocols may use an IAR integrity protection key (KIAR INT ) to verify the integrity of information in an IAR message and/or an IAS integrity protection key (KIAS INT ) to verify the integrity of information in an IAS message. The KIAR ENC , KIAR INT , KIAS ENC , and/or KIAS INT may be independently computed by the UE and a home subscriber server (HSS).

What is claimed is: 
     
         1 . A method for secure authentication, the method comprising:
 generating, by a user equipment (UE), a first integrity key based at least on a pre-provisioned key (K key) of the UE and a first random number (RAND1);   generating a message authentication code (MAC) signature by computing a hash function of UE specific information using the first integrity key, the UE specific information including at least an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of the UE and the RAND1 ;   encrypting the UE specific information and the MAC signature using a public key to form an encrypted portion; and   sending an initial authentication request (IAR) message to a base station in a serving network, the IAR message carrying the encrypted portion and an unencrypted network identifier.