Methods and systems for enhancing privacy on distributed ledger-based networks

Abstract

One or more embodiments described herein disclose methods and systems that are directed at providing enhanced privacy and security to distributed ledger-based networks (DLNs) via the implementation of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) in the DLNs. ZKPs allow participants of DLNs to make statements on the DLNs about some private information and to prove the truth of the information without having to necessarily reveal the private information publicly. As such, the disclosed methods and systems directed at the ZKP-enabled DLNs provide privacy to participants of the DLNs while still allowing the DLNs to remain as consensus-based networks.

1 . A method, comprising:
 receiving a request that is configured to cause a registration of a token commitment on a distributed ledger-based network (DLN), the token commitment representing an asset on the DLN and the request including an identifying parameter of the asset;   providing by a provider, in response to the request and to a self-executing code segment on the DLN, a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) that the provider has knowledge of an identity of an asset token where when a hashing function is applied to the asset token, the token commitment is generated; and   receiving, after verification of the ZKP by the self-executing code segment, a confirmation confirming the registration of the token commitment on the DLN including an addition of the token commitment onto a token commitments data structure on the DLN.   
     
     
         2 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein:
 the hashing function is a first hashing function;   the asset token is obtained via an application of a second hashing function on the identifying parameter of the asset.   
     
     
         3 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein:
 the hashing function is a first hashing function;   the ZKP includes the ZKP that the provider of the ZKP has knowledge of the identity of the asset token that when a second hashing function is applied to the asset token, a first hash value is generated;   the token commitment is registered after the self-executing code segment verifies that the first hash value is not stored in a double-spend preventer data structure on the DLN prior to the registration of the token commitment.   
     
     
         4 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein:
 the hashing function is a first hashing function;   the ZKP includes the ZKP that the provider of the ZKP has knowledge of the identity of the asset token that when a second hashing function is applied to the asset token, a first hash value is generated;   the token commitment is registered after the self-executing code segment adds the first hash value into a double-spend preventer data structure on the DLN after verifying that the first hash value is not stored in the double-spend preventer data structure.   
     
     
         5 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the token commitment represents a non-fungible token. 
     
     
         6 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the application of the hashing function includes the application of the hashing function on an identifier associated with an owner of the token commitment and/or a random nonce. 
     
     
         7 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the application of the hashing function includes the application of the hashing function on an identifier associated with an owner of the token commitment and/or a random nonce, the identifier including a public key of the owner on the DLN. 
     
     
         8 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the ZKP and/or the verification of the ZKP do not reveal the identifying parameter of the asset and/or a random nonce used to generate the token commitment on the DLN. 
     
     
         9 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein the registration of the token commitment occurs without revealing any identifying information of the asset, any identifying information of the asset, and/or a random nonce used to generate the token commitment on the DLN. 
     
     
         10 . A method, comprising:
 receiving a request that is configured to cause a transfer of an asset from a sender to a recipient, the asset represented on a distributed ledger-based network (DLN) by a first token commitment;   providing by a provider, in response to the request and to a self-executing code segment on the DLN, a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) that the provider of the ZKP has knowledge of an identity of an asset token,
 (1) an application of a first hashing function on the asset token generating the first token commitment, and/or 
 (2) an application of a second hashing function on the asset token generating a second token commitment representing the asset on the DLN; and 
   receiving, upon verification of the ZKP by the self-executing code segment, a confirmation confirming an addition of the second token commitment onto a token commitments data structure on the DLN.   
     
     
         11 . The method of  claim 10 , wherein the ZKP includes the ZKP that the provider has knowledge of an identity of:
 (a) a first identifier associated with the sender, the application of the first hashing function including the application of the first hashing function on the first identifier, and/or   (b) a second identifier associated with the recipient, the application of the second hashing function including the application of the second hashing function on the second identifier.   
     
     
         12 . The method of  claim 10 , wherein the ZKP includes the ZKP that the provider has knowledge of an identity of:
 (a) a first identifier associated with the sender, the application of the first hashing function including the application of the first hashing function on the first identifier, the first identifier including a public key of the sender on the DLN, and/or   (b) a second identifier associated with the recipient, the application of the second hashing function including the application of the second hashing function on the second identifier, the second identifier including a public key of the recipient on the DLN.   
     
     
         13 . The method of  claim 10 , wherein the ZKP includes the ZKP that the provider has knowledge of an identity of a nullifier obtained via an application of a third hashing function on a random nonce and/or a secret identifier associated with the sender,
 a presence of the nullifier in a nullifier data structure on the DLN indicating invalidity of the first token commitment.   
     
     
         14 . The method of  claim 10 , wherein the ZKP includes the ZKP that the provider has knowledge of an identity of a nullifier obtained via an application of a third hashing function on a random nonce and/or a secret identifier associated with the sender,
 a presence of the nullifier in a nullifier data structure on the DLN indicating invalidity of the first token commitment,   the application of the first hashing function including the application of the first hashing function on the random nonce.   
     
     
         15 . The method of  claim 10 , wherein the ZKP includes the ZKP that the provider has knowledge of an identity of a nullifier obtained via an application of a third hashing function on the random nonce and/or a secret identifier associated with the sender,
 a presence of the nullifier in a nullifier data structure on the DLN indicating invalidity of the first token commitment,   the secret identifier including the private key of the sender.   
     
     
         16 . The method of  claim 10 , wherein the ZKP includes the ZKP that the provider is capable of deriving a public identifier associated with the sender from a secret identifier associated with the sender. 
     
     
         17 . The method of  claim 10 , wherein the ZKP includes the ZKP that the provider is capable of deriving a public identifier associated with the sender from a secret identifier associated with the sender, the public identifier and the secret identifier including a public key and a private key, respectively, of the sender on the DLN. 
     
     
         18 . The method of  claim 10 , wherein the second token commitment is added onto the commitments data structure after the self-executing code segment verifies a nullifier is not stored in a nullifier data structure on the DLN, a presence of the nullifier in the nullifier data structure indicating invalidity of the first token commitment. 
     
     
         19 . The method of  claim 10 , wherein the second token commitment is added onto the commitments data structure after the self-executing code segment adds a nullifier into a nullifier data structure on the DLN after verifying that the nullifier is not stored in the nullifier data structure, a presence of the nullifier in the nullifier data structure indicating invalidity of the first token commitment. 
     
     
         20 . The method of  claim 10 , wherein the verification of the ZKP by the self-executing code segment occurs without revealing any identifying information of the asset on the DLN. 
     
     
         21 - 30 . (canceled)