Blockchain-implemented security systems and methods for blinded outcome selection

Abstract

First secrets are generated by a first party. The first secrets are encrypted by the first party utilizing elliptic curve cryptography to obtain data points representing encrypted versions of the first secrets. A message, which includes the data points, is sent by the first party to a second party. A first transaction created by the second party is verified by the first party ensuring that cryptographic locks generated by the second party are based on allowed linear combinations of encrypted versions of the first secrets and encrypted versions of second secrets generated by the second party. One secret from the first secrets is randomly selected by the first party. Another message, which includes the one secret, is sent by the first party to the second party such that the second party can generate a cryptographic key that unlocks a cryptographic lock of the cryptographic locks generated by the second party.

1 . A blockchain-implemented security method involving a first party and a second party, the method comprising:
 generating, by the first party, a first plurality of n secrets;   encrypting, by the first party, the first plurality of n secrets utilizing elliptic curve cryptography to obtain n resultant data points that represent encrypted versions of the first plurality of n secrets;   sending, by the first party, a message to the second party which includes the n resultant data points;   verifying, by the first party, a first transaction created by the second party to ensure that a plurality of n cryptographic locks generated by the second party is based on allowed linear combinations of encrypted versions of the first plurality of n secrets generated by the first party and encrypted versions of a second plurality of n secrets generated by the second party;   randomly selecting, by the first party, one secret belonging to the first plurality of n secrets generated by the first party; and   sending, by the first party, a message to the second party which includes the one secret randomly selected by the first party, such that the second party can generate a cryptographic key that unlocks a particular cryptographic lock of a plurality of n cryptographic locks generated by the second party.   
     
     
         2 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein
 the encrypted versions of the first plurality of n secrets generated by the first party are communicated to the second party without revealing the first plurality of n secrets to the second party.   
     
     
         3 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein verifying, by the first party, the first transaction using data derived from the encrypted versions of the first plurality of n secrets as well as the encrypted versions of the second plurality of n secrets without revealing the second plurality of n secrets generated by the second party to the first party. 
     
     
         4 . The method of  claim 3 ,
 wherein the one secret belonging to the first plurality of n secrets generated by the first party is randomly selected by the first party in response to successful verification of the first transaction.   
     
     
         5 . The method of  claim 1 , further comprising:
 receiving, at the first party, a message from the second party which includes a number n for a set of n transaction outputs of the first transaction.   
     
     
         6 . The method of  claim 1 , wherein
 the first party verifies the first transaction utilizing data derived from a combination of the encrypted versions of the second plurality of n secrets generated by the second party without revealing the second plurality of n secrets generated by the second party to the first party.   
     
     
         7 - 12 . (canceled) 
     
     
         13 . The method according to  claim 6 , wherein the verification of the first transaction involves operations of a form
   [( k]   B   (1)   G+k   B   (2)   G . . . +k   B   (n)   G )+( k   A   (1)   G+k   A   (2)   G . . . +k   A   (n)   G ) ( k   A   (1)   +k   B   (1) ) G +( k   A   (2)   +k   B   (2) ) G  . . . +( k   A   (n)   +k   B   (n) ) G,      where k A   (1) , k A   (2) , . . . k A   (n)  are the first plurality of n secrets,
 k B   (1) , k B   (2) , . . . k B   (n)  are the second plurality of n secrets, and 
 G is a point on an elliptic curve; 
 k A   (1) G, k A   (2) G, . . . k A   (n) G are encrypted versions of the first plurality of n secrets; and 
 k B   (1) G, k B   (2) G, . . . k B   (n) G are encrypted versions of the second plurality of n secrets. 
   
     
     
         14 . A non-transitory computer readable storage medium comprising computer-executable instructions which, when executed, configure a processor to perform the method of  claim 1 . 
     
     
         15 . An electronic device comprising:
 an interface device;   a processor coupled to the interface device; and   a memory coupled to the processor, the memory having stored thereon computer executable instructions which, when executed, configure the processor to perform any part of the method of  claim 1 .