End-to-End Encryption and Hot Wallet Key Recovery Apparatuses, Processes and Systems

Abstract

The End-to-End Encryption and Hot Wallet Key Recovery Apparatuses, Processes and Systems (“E2EEHWKR”) transforms key backup request, key recovery request datastructure/inputs via E2EEHWKR components into key backup response, key recovery response outputs. A key backup request datastructure specifying a wallet private key, a private key backup server identifier, a PIN shard fracture scheme definition, and a plurality of PIN shard backup devices is obtained. A user security PIN is obtained and utilized to encrypt the wallet private key. A symmetric key is calculated from a public key associated with the private key backup server identifier and an app private key. The encrypted wallet private key is encrypted utilizing the symmetric key. The twice encrypted wallet private key is sent to a private key backup server. The user security PIN is encrypted utilizing an asymmetric keypair. Encrypted user security PIN shards are generated and sent to PIN shard backup devices.

What is claimed is: 
     
         1 . A fracturable user security PIN based crypto wallet backup apparatus, comprising:
 at least one memory;   a component collection stored in the at least one memory;   any of at least one processor disposed in communication with the at least one memory, the any of at least one processor executing processor-executable instructions from the component collection, storage of the component collection structured with processor-executable instructions comprising:
 obtain, via the any of at least one processor, a key backup request datastructure, in which the key backup request datastructure is structured as specifying a wallet private key, a private key backup server identifier, a PIN shard fracture scheme definition, and a plurality of PIN shard backup devices; 
 obtain, via the any of at least one processor, a user security PIN; 
 encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the wallet private key utilizing the user security PIN; 
 determine, via the any of at least one processor, a public key associated with the private key backup server identifier; 
 calculate, via the any of at least one processor, a symmetric key from the public key associated with the private key backup server identifier and an app private key; 
 encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the encrypted wallet private key utilizing the symmetric key; 
 send, via the any of at least one processor, the twice encrypted wallet private key to a private key backup server corresponding to the private key backup server identifier; 
 generate, via the any of at least one processor, an asymmetric keypair; 
 encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the user security PIN utilizing a public key of the asymmetric keypair; 
 generate, via the any of at least one processor, a number of encrypted user security PIN shards from the encrypted user security PIN using a secret sharing method, in which the number of encrypted user security PIN shards to generate is specified via the PIN shard fracture scheme definition; and 
 send, via the any of at least one processor, each of the generated encrypted user security PIN shards to a corresponding PIN shard backup device from the plurality of PIN shard backup devices. 
   
     
     
         2 . The apparatus of  claim 1 , in which the PIN shard fracture scheme definition is structured as specifying an M of N fracture scheme. 
     
     
         3 . The apparatus of  claim 2 , in which N specifies the number of encrypted user security PIN shards to generate and M specifies how many encrypted user security PIN shards are sufficient to constitute the encrypted user security PIN. 
     
     
         4 . The apparatus of  claim 1 , in which a PIN shard backup device is one of: a cloud, a mobile device, a cold storage device, a hardware security module, a backup server, a trusted contact. 
     
     
         5 . The apparatus of  claim 1 , in which the user security PIN is obtained from a user via a user security PIN interaction interface mechanism. 
     
     
         6 . The apparatus of  claim 1 , in which the private key backup server is structured to be unable to decrypt the encrypted wallet private key. 
     
     
         7 . The apparatus of  claim 6 , in which the private key backup server is structured not to have access to the user security PIN. 
     
     
         8 . The apparatus of  claim 1 , in which the symmetric key is calculated via Diffie-Hellman Key-Exchange. 
     
     
         9 . The apparatus of  claim 1 , in which the user security PIN is encrypted via an API call to an encryption library implementing a security protocol. 
     
     
         10 . The apparatus of  claim 1 , in which the asymmetric keypair is an RSA keypair. 
     
     
         11 . The apparatus of  claim 1 , in which the secret sharing method is Shamir's secret sharing. 
     
     
         12 . The apparatus of  claim 1 , in which the storage of the component collection is further structured with processor-executable instructions comprising:
 obtain, via the any of at least one processor, a key recovery request datastructure associated with the wallet private key, in which the key recovery request datastructure is structured as specifying a subset of the plurality of PIN shard backup devices;   obtain, via the any of at least one processor, the twice encrypted wallet private key from the private key backup server corresponding to the private key backup server identifier;   decrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the twice encrypted wallet private key utilizing the symmetric key to determine the encrypted wallet private key;   obtain, via the any of at least one processor, a number of encrypted user security PIN shards sufficient to constitute the encrypted user security PIN from the subset of the plurality of PIN shard backup devices;   constitute, via the any of at least one processor, the encrypted user security PIN from the obtained encrypted user security PIN shards using the secret sharing method;   decrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the encrypted user security PIN utilizing a private key of the asymmetric keypair to determine the user security PIN; and   decrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the encrypted wallet private key utilizing the user security PIN to recover the wallet private key.   
     
     
         13 . The apparatus of  claim 12 , in which the storage of the component collection is further structured with processor-executable instructions comprising:
 provide, via the any of at least one processor, the recovered wallet private key to a requestor.   
     
     
         14 . The apparatus of  claim 12 , in which the storage of the component collection is further structured with processor-executable instructions comprising:
 generate, via the any of at least one processor, a user security PIN interaction interface mechanism; and   obtain, via the any of at least one processor, an updated user security PIN from a user via the user security PIN interaction interface mechanism.   
     
     
         15 . The apparatus of  claim 14 , in which the storage of the component collection is further structured with processor-executable instructions comprising:
 generate, via the any of at least one processor, an updated key backup request datastructure, in which the updated key backup request datastructure is structured as specifying the recovered wallet private key, the private key backup server identifier, the PIN shard fracture scheme definition, the plurality of PIN shard backup devices, and the updated user security PIN.   
     
     
         16 . A fracturable user security PIN based crypto wallet backup processor-readable, non-transient medium, the medium storing a component collection, storage of the component collection structured with processor-executable instructions comprising:
 obtain, via the any of at least one processor, a key backup request datastructure, in which the key backup request datastructure is structured as specifying a wallet private key, a private key backup server identifier, a PIN shard fracture scheme definition, and a plurality of PIN shard backup devices;   obtain, via the any of at least one processor, a user security PIN;   encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the wallet private key utilizing the user security PIN;   determine, via the any of at least one processor, a public key associated with the private key backup server identifier;   calculate, via the any of at least one processor, a symmetric key from the public key associated with the private key backup server identifier and an app private key;   encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the encrypted wallet private key utilizing the symmetric key;   send, via the any of at least one processor, the twice encrypted wallet private key to a private key backup server corresponding to the private key backup server identifier;   generate, via the any of at least one processor, an asymmetric keypair;   encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the user security PIN utilizing a public key of the asymmetric keypair;   generate, via the any of at least one processor, a number of encrypted user security PIN shards from the encrypted user security PIN using a secret sharing method, in which the number of encrypted user security PIN shards to generate is specified via the PIN shard fracture scheme definition; and   send, via the any of at least one processor, each of the generated encrypted user security PIN shards to a corresponding PIN shard backup device from the plurality of PIN shard backup devices.   
     
     
         17 . A fracturable user security PIN based crypto wallet backup processor-implemented system, comprising:
 means to store a component collection;   means to process processor-executable instructions from the component collection, storage of the component collection structured with processor-executable instructions comprising:
 obtain, via the any of at least one processor, a key backup request datastructure, in which the key backup request datastructure is structured as specifying a wallet private key, a private key backup server identifier, a PIN shard fracture scheme definition, and a plurality of PIN shard backup devices; 
 obtain, via the any of at least one processor, a user security PIN; 
 encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the wallet private key utilizing the user security PIN; 
 determine, via the any of at least one processor, a public key associated with the private key backup server identifier; 
 calculate, via the any of at least one processor, a symmetric key from the public key associated with the private key backup server identifier and an app private key; 
 encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the encrypted wallet private key utilizing the symmetric key; 
 send, via the any of at least one processor, the twice encrypted wallet private key to a private key backup server corresponding to the private key backup server identifier; 
 generate, via the any of at least one processor, an asymmetric keypair; 
 encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the user security PIN utilizing a public key of the asymmetric keypair; 
 generate, via the any of at least one processor, a number of encrypted user security PIN shards from the encrypted user security PIN using a secret sharing method, in which the number of encrypted user security PIN shards to generate is specified via the PIN shard fracture scheme definition; and 
 send, via the any of at least one processor, each of the generated encrypted user security PIN shards to a corresponding PIN shard backup device from the plurality of PIN shard backup devices. 
   
     
     
         18 . A fracturable user security PIN based crypto wallet backup processor-implemented process, including processing processor-executable instructions via any of at least one processor from a component collection stored in at least one memory, storage of the component collection structured with processor-executable instructions comprising:
 obtain, via the any of at least one processor, a key backup request datastructure, in which the key backup request datastructure is structured as specifying a wallet private key, a private key backup server identifier, a PIN shard fracture scheme definition, and a plurality of PIN shard backup devices;   obtain, via the any of at least one processor, a user security PIN;   encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the wallet private key utilizing the user security PIN;   determine, via the any of at least one processor, a public key associated with the private key backup server identifier;   calculate, via the any of at least one processor, a symmetric key from the public key associated with the private key backup server identifier and an app private key;   encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the encrypted wallet private key utilizing the symmetric key;   send, via the any of at least one processor, the twice encrypted wallet private key to a private key backup server corresponding to the private key backup server identifier;   generate, via the any of at least one processor, an asymmetric keypair;   encrypt, via the any of at least one processor, the user security PIN utilizing a public key of the asymmetric keypair;   generate, via the any of at least one processor, a number of encrypted user security PIN shards from the encrypted user security PIN using a secret sharing method, in which the number of encrypted user security PIN shards to generate is specified via the PIN shard fracture scheme definition; and   send, via the any of at least one processor, each of the generated encrypted user security PIN shards to a corresponding PIN shard backup device from the plurality of PIN shard backup devices.